

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WUIND 71 0501



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 1 May 1971

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~







SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971


Weekly average for each month

JANUARY 1971 - MAY 1971

Weekly data as reported




US BATTLE DEATHS




rose sharply from last week's 45 to 67.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




climbed to 306 from last week's abnormally low figure of 236. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at four specially designated groups with a total of 80 personnel. The infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 is now some 58,300 - 60,300.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




increased slightly from last week's 645 to 683.

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



continued on a downward trend as 1,657 were reported versus the 1,788 of last week.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces dropped to 72% from last week's 90%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The flurry of enemy-initiated attacks, which occurred early in the week in widely scattered parts of South Vietnam's Military Regions 1 and 2, subsided rapidly. Some recent reports indicate that the Communists would like to sustain a higher level of attacks against the government's pacification efforts, but the enemy does not now appear to be in a position to carry out such a sustained endeavor. The rise in U.S. deaths during the reporting period (67 versus 45 during the previous week) largely reflects increased enemy strikes against several American installations which occurred during the beginning of the week here covered.

In Cambodia, the fighting has been at comparatively low levels and apparently neither side has seriously damaged the other. In the southwest, Cambodian task forces have linked up at the Pich Nil Pass area on Route 4 after successfully routing the Communists. Clean-up operations are continuing, however, and it may be several days before traffic begins moving through the Pass. There has been little activity in the TOAN THANG area of operation, partially due to the low morale of the South Vietnamese troops.

Government forces in Laos have successfully completed the first phase of their campaign to recover lost ground north and east of Luang Prabang. They have cleared a 20-kilometer arc, and are moving toward the objectives of phase two of their offensive some 30 kilometers out from the Royal Capital. In MR II, southwest of the Plain of Jars, friendly forces have launched a drive to recapture a paramilitary site 25 kilometers northeast of Long Tieng, in spite of steady enemy shelling and ground probes on other friendly positions. In south Laos, the expected enemy attack on Muong Phalane (MR III) and the resultant heavy fighting forced friendly forces to evacuate the area on 2 May. Farther south in MR IV, there has been light contact around the Bolovens Plateau, while Pathet Lao ralliers continue to straggle in to Pakse.

Enemy Infiltration

Detections of infiltration activity remained at an extremely low level during the week with only four specially designated groups with an estimated strength of 80 noted. The estimate of the total number of infiltrators moving southward toward Cambodia/South Vietnam since 1 October 1970 now stands at some 58,300 to 60,300. While it is possible that personnel infiltration may have essentially been completed for the current season, available evidence indicates that the Communists plan to continue transportation operations at a sustained pace during the rainy season. This suggests that the enemy may attempt to continue personnel infiltration to replace recent dry season losses or to build up Communist forces in anticipation of a military campaign of larger consequence in Indochina later in the year.

South Vietnam Developments

Vice President Ky is again signalling his desire to stand as a presidential candidate. Ky acknowledged publicly this week that he will probably run and in private conversations with his supporters he is expressing confidence that his middle course between Thieu's hard line and Minh's alleged soft line will appeal to large segments of the voters. Whether he runs or not, both Thieu and Big Minh have privately rejected the possibility of Ky running on their tickets in the number two spot.

The ARVN general staff has presented an estimate to President Thieu which anticipates a major Communist offensive early next year. The staff also believes that the Communists will carry out offensives of some kind prior to the South Vietnamese election next October and prior to the U.S. elections in the fall of 1972. Based on these projections, Thieu has ordered that Saigon's present general reserve of about three divisions be increased to five.

the South Vietnamese may approach the U.S. for more funds and equipment in order to activate the new units.

Communist Developments

In separate conversations with a Western visitor to Hanoi in early April, diplomats from the Soviet Union and from Rumania mentioned ARVN successes in the LAM SON 719 operation. The Soviet military attache discounted the DRV's propaganda portrait and appeared to accept the view that the operation was as much an ARVN victory as a Communist one. The Rumanian military attache likewise appeared to give the impression that ARVN successes outnumbered Communist successes. Moreover, he was seemingly impressed with ARVN's "aggressive spirit and general efficiency" during the operation.

The Hanoi regime continues to give widespread attention in its press and other media to reports of enthusiastic local area responses to the Party's troop recruitment drives. For well over a year Hanoi has been embarked on a publicity campaign regarding troop recruitment for "frontline" duty, as in contrast to earlier years, particularly during the year prior to Tet 1968, when comparatively little attention on this subject was evident in the press. Hanoi is currently reporting that draft and volunteer quotas are being fulfilled and over-fulfilled, but what these quota claims mean in actual numbers is hard to say. New recruits will require a minimum of two to three months' training and indoctrination before they can be considered available for infiltration to South Vietnam.

~~Top Secret~~